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THE RECENT EROSION OF THE
SECURED CREDITOR'S RIGHTS





One can view the law of creditors' rights as a series of cycles
in which alternatively the rights of the creditor and then those
of the debtor are in ascendancy. Looking back through American
legislative history, one sees both the state legislatures and the
Congress intervening on behalf of debtors in a variety of ways on
many occasions. An early example of such intervention was the
enactment, particularly in the Midwest and West, of generous
exemption laws' that removed a variety of property beyond the
reach of general creditors. A second example is the enactment of
usury laws, which continue to be a substantial restriction on the
rates that creditors can charge to consumer debtors.' Other ex-
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A.,
1956, Amherst College; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan.
The author wishes to acknowledge the work of Teri Rasmussen, Class of 1984, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School.
' In 1871, a Louisiana debtor could exempt as much as $18,000 worth of property
and a Kansas debtor could exempt more than $6,200 worth of property. See P. Coleman,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, 1 N. Am. 25 (1974). See also Comment, Debtor Exemption
Laws and the Farmer: Suggestions for Judicial Reform, 11 U.C.D.L. Rov. 573, 573,78
(1978) (while now often rendered obsolete by inflation and technological advances, ex-
emption statutes were generally commensurate with the living standards at the time of
their enactment).
2 Currently, forty-seven states have general usury ceilings. Note, Usury Legisla-
tion-Its Effects on the Economy and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REv. 199, 199
(1980). These statutes vary widely in their permissible interest rates, methods of setting
rates, exceptions, allowable defenses, and sanctions. Long, Trends in Usury Legisla-
tion-Current Interest Overdue, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 325, 328 (1980). For specification
of the maximum legal and contract rates allowed, see 1 CONSUMER CRED. GumE (CCH) I
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amples are laws giving mortgagors rights to redeem property af-
ter foreclosures and laws providing for upset prices at foreclo-
sure sales.4 These legislative attempts to protect certain debtor
interests often have been frustrated by the clever devices of
creditors' lawyers. Thus, some of the restrictions on foreclosure
and redemption periods were met by deeds of trust with explicit
powers to sell.' Usury laws have been circumvented by the advo-
cacy of the time-price doctrine and by the substitution of a vari-
ety of fees and charges in lieu of interest. Thus, if one carefully
examined the law of most states, one would find a continuous
cycle of hard times, debtor complaint, legislative response, and
creditor attempts at circumvention.
It is my thesis that from the election of President Johnson
in 1965 until the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978,
we have witnessed one-half of such a cycle. During that time
Congress enacted eight titles of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act.7 Various parts of that Act protect debtors against certain
510.
3 A statutory right of redemption after foreclosure is available in twenty-six states.
Comment, Statutory Redemption Following Power of Sale Foreclosure in Missouri, 47
Mo. L. REV. 309, 310 (1982). See generally A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE,
LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 139-40 (1978); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 536-47 (1979) (generally describing the variations and effect
of statutory rights of redemption).
I A vestige of the Great Depression, the fixing of a minimum upset price at which
the land must be bid in if the sale is to be confirmed was first established judicially. See
Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W. 556, 557 (1933). While somewhat
limited by subsequent decisions, the underlying principle has been preserved to some
extent by statute. See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW 466-71 (1979) (describing the conducting of a foreclosure sale, including
the nature and purpose of an upset price).
6 See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 621 (1981).
' See Jordan and Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 441, 443 (1967); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulations: A Credi-
tor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 452-54 (1968) (discussing the usefulness
of the time-price doctrine in the growth of credit selling as a means of avoiding usury
restrictions). Despite substantial criticism, the time-price doctrine remains viable. See R.
SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAw 447 (1981). See also
Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 396
(1968) (charges such as brokerage or investigation fees, while technically not interest,
effectively increase the return to the lender).
7 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978); Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977); Consumer Leasing Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (1976); Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amend-
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forms of garnishment,8 restrict the collection activities of profes-
sional debt collectors,9 require certain credit-price disclosures to
consumer-debtors,10 and impose a set of rules upon those that
conduct consumer electronic fund transfers.1 In the same spirit
of consumer protection, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code was
recommended for adoption in the various states by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, first in
1968, and then in 1974 as amended to conform with the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act. Designed comprehensively to regulate
loan and sale credit up to $25,000 to individuals for personal,
family, household, or agricultural purposes, various provisions
include uniform disclosure requirements, ceilings on charges,
and restrictions on contract terms and enforcement rights."
Some states, such as Iowa' 8 and Wisconsin,"' passed legislation
even more solicitous of the consumer. Wisconsin, for instance,
specifically authorized class actions for alleged violations,, made
Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures applicable in a wider range of
transactions, 6 placed additional restraints on creditor collec-
tions activity,17 and expanded the UCCC "cooling off period"
beyond credit sales consumated in the home."8
One can argue that the debtor portion of the cycle reached
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976); Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
* Consumer Credit Protection Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1976).
* Consumer Credit Protection Act § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Supp. V 1981).
10 Consumer Credit Protection Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
" Consumer Credit Protection Act § 901, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (Supp. V 1981).
"Currently only ten states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code in
any form. For a description of its provisions and state variations, see 1 CONSUMER Ciworr
GUIDE (CCH) 4770.
s IOWA CODE § 537 (1983).
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, see
Davis, Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study of the
Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MicH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1973).
16 The UCCC was silent on the matter. See Barrett & Jones, Wisconsin Consumer
Act-A Freak Out, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 483, 489-91 (1974).
'0 See Heiser, Wisconsin Consumer Act-A Critical Analysis, 57 MARq. L. Rev.
389, 423-28 (1974).
'7 See Barrett & Jones, supra note 15, at 498-501.
'8 See Heiser, supra note 16, at 448-49.
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its apogee with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
(the Code) on November 6, 1978. The Code contained little that
was directly beneficial to secured creditors' interests, and much
that was damaging. It was passed over the vigorous objection of
some creditors and with the reluctant cooperation of others."
One suspects that those who cooperated did so out of a fear that
they would have fared even worse had they not presented their
arguments to the Congress. The Bankruptcy Reform Act had
been before the Congress in various forms since 1973.20 It is im-
probable that the Code in its current form could have made it
through any Congress prior to 1978 or any since the election of
President Reagan.
This expansion of debtors' rights beginning in 1965 came on
the heels of one of the most important codifications of creditors'
During the subcommittee hearings, some creditors strongly opposed the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act. See, e.g., Hearings on HR 31 and HR 32 before the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1737 (1976) (testimony of Franklin Cole, Chairman of Walter Heller &
Co.) (proposed Act will not benefit bankrupts or unsecured creditors and will injure
small and medium-sized businesses by drying up an already limited source of financing);
id. at 1824 (testimony of Eli Silberfield, general counsel for the National Commercial
Finance Conference) (proposed Act increases the cost of financing and therefore makes it
unavailable to small businesses).
Other creditors said that they favored the Act, but would make significant changes.
See id. at 1776 (testimony of Martin Pinsen, representing the National Association of
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs)) (favoring the Act, but desirous of ex-
cluding SBICs from the category of affiliates since affiliates' claims are subordinate to
those of other creditors); id. at 1666 (testimony of Richard Kaufman, National Associa-
tion of Credit Management) (bill is fundamentally sound but creditors should have more
control in bankruptcy proceedings and be able to select a trustee and elect a creditors'
committee in rehabilitation chapter cases); id. at 1775 (testimony of Patrick Murphy)
(Act does not sufficiently clarify the rights of secured creditors in rehabilitation
proceedings).
See also Reisman, The Challenge of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act to Accounts Re-
ceivable and Inventory Financing of Small-to-Medium-Sized Businesses, 83 CoM. L. J.
169, 211 (1978) (proposed Act creat-e a "minefield -f the unwary creditor." encourages
debtors to declare bankruptcy, and will severely diminish the flow of credit, especially to
small businessmen).
20 See P. MURPHY, CREDrros' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTcY § 1.05 (1980). For a descrip-
tion of the origins of the movement for comprehensive reform of the bankruptcy laws
and its subsequent odyssey, see Kennedy, Background and Overview of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, in TiE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 2-11 (C. Holmes ed. 1979). For a
discussion of specific bills introduced prior to the final bill, see 1 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTcY T 1.03 (rev. 15th ed. 1983).
[VOL.. 53
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interests, namely, the enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. In the 1950's and through the middle of the
1960's, all of the states but Louisiana enacted Article 9 of the
UCC.2 1 By validating provisions such as after-acquired property
clauses 2 and the secured creditors' rights with respect to future
advances, 2  and by granting a simple, inexpensive and precise
" A tabular record of the Code's enactment in the various states can be found in 1
U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 1982). Thirty-two states now have adopted the 1972 revisions of Arti-
cle 9. See Schimberg, Secured Transactions, 36 Bus. LAw. 1347, 1347 (1981). Unless
otherwise noted, all citations to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) will be to the 1972
version.
" Article 9 permits creation of a "floating lien" in accounts receivable, inventory,
proceeds or similar property other than nonaccession consumer goods acquired subse-
quent to the formation of the original security agreement that secures any or all obliga-
tions covered by that agreement. See U.C.C. §§ 9-204, -306 (1972). Although a floating
lien can be subordinated to a conflicting purchase money security interest pursuant to
U.C.C. § 9-312 (3)-(4) (1972), the Article 9 provisions generally recognize a broader after-
acquired property interest than existed prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Several states refused to recognize floating liens at all, apparently in the belief
that to ensure the protection of creditors a borrower should not be allowed to encumber
all his assets. See U.C.C. ]!e 9-204 comment 2 (1972). Many states required successive
filings with each acquisition of property by the debtor, and others required new chattel
mortgages or similar security devices as well as additional filings for each transaction if a
creditor was to have effective rights even against the debtor. The secured party might
also be required to exercise extensive control over his collateral to maintain his security
interest; U.C.C. § 9-205 abolishes this "policing" rule. Section 9-204(1) places a security
interest arising out of an after-acquired property clause on an equal footing with a secur-
ity interest in collateral in which the debtor has rights at the time the security agreement
is negotiated without any further action by the secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-204 com-
ment 1 (1972).
23 Although few jurisdictions went so far as to invalidate future advance agreements,
a pre-Code prejudice existed against such arrangements comparable to that against af-
ter-acquired property clauses. Frequently the original security agreement was required to
specify the amount and disbursement time of the advances for them to be valid. See
U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5 (1972). Section 9-204(3) authorizes future advances, requiring
only that the obligation be one covered by the security agreement. Section 9-312(7) in
general provides that the priority of a subsequent advance relates back to the original
filing when in conflict with another security interest, regardless whether made pursuant
to commitment.
Buyers other than in the ordinary course of business are permitted to take free of
the security interest only in the rare instance when the advance is not made pursuant to
a commitment entered into prior to the forty-sixth day after the purchase and either the
advance is made more than forty-five days after the purchase or the secured party knows
of the purchase. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1972). Similarly, lien creditors can subordinate future
advances only if they are made more than forty-five days after the lien arises and then
only if they are made with knowledge of the lien and not subject to a prior commitment
made without knowledge. U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972). This forty-five day period corre-
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method of acquiring priority, 2' Article 9 expanded and con-
firmed personal property secured creditors' rights.
Why the cycle reversed itself in the mid 1960's is unclear.
Unlike many prior debtor cycles that were stimulated by the
desperate needs of debtors in the grips of recession, this cycle
commenced in a time of relative prosperity. On a superficial
level one might argue that the reversal is but an additional man-
ifestation of the anti-establishment views of the post-Vietnam
era, of George McGovern, and of the left wing of the Democratic
party. This is too simple, for one sees seeds of the movement
with President Johnson and his "great society." History may
conclude that President Johnson, like President Jackson 130
years previously, was bringing southern populism to Washing-
sponds to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 provision regarding protection of advances
made after the filing of tax liens. See I.R.C. § 6323(c), (d) (1976). For further discussion
regarding the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966's expansion of secured creditor's rights, see
infra note 24.
U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972) grants a secured creditor, even an unperfected secured cred-
itor, priority over an unsecured creditor without a lien. While § 9-301(1)(b) (1972) pro-
vides that an unperfected secured creditor is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor,
by negative implication a prudent secured creditor can avoid the problem simply by
perfecting his security interest pursuant to the instructions specified in § 9-303 (1972).
Priority among conflicting nonpurchase money security interests in the same collateral is
given to the first perfected or filed, whichever is earlier, so long as there is no period
thereafter in which there is neither filing nor perfection. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972). Other
rules of priority governing particular sorts of conflicting security interests are provided in
other subsections of § 9-312 as well as in § 9-313 (fixtures), § 9-314 (accessions), § 9-315
(commingled goods), and § 9-306 (proceeds).
A trustee in bankruptcy has the rights of a lien creditor and is treated so under the
Uniform Commercial Code. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1976); U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1972). Thus a
prudent secured creditor can easily gain priority over the trustee in bankruptcy by
perfecting his security interest.
A prudent secured creditor also can maintain his priority over federal tax liens pro-
vided he checks the files every forty-five days. If the security interest is perfected before
the tax lien is filed, the secured party wins even if he had actual knowledge of the tax
lien. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1976). Even after notice of the tax lien is filed, the secured creditor
can make disbursements before the forty-sixth day folluwing the tax l:-n filing date if hc
has no actual knowledge of the tax lien. I.R.C. § 6323(d) (1976). The secured creditor
also can reach after-acquired property obtained by the debtor-taxpayer within forty-five
days following the tax lien filing date. I.R.C. § 6323(c) (1976). Article 9 has sought to
preserve this priority in its rules governing conflicts between lien creditors and secured
creditors.
This is a significant change from the law prior to 1966, which made any disburse-
ment after the tax lien was filed subordinate to the tax lien. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX
LIENS 88 (3d ed. 1972).
[VOL. 53
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ton. By the late 1960's, it seems likely that there was a conflu-
ence of all the wings of the Democratic party, from the
southerners who were conservative in many respects but popu-
lists in matters of money, to the northern liberals and even radi-
cals to whom private property was suspect. The force was so
strong that even President Nixon, who hardly could have been
sympathetic to the movement, supported the establishment of
the National Institute for Consumer Justice."5 Almost annually
the Congress added to the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and
encroached further on traditional state creditors'-rights law. 6
Here too, the Federal Trade Commission was emboldened to
tread on the most sacred principle of all and effectively to abol-
ish the holder in due course doctrine by its rule promulgated in
1975.27
Against the background of such enactments that were
overtly and intentionally contrary to creditor interests, the
,8 The National Institute for Consumer Justice, inspired by a February 1971 presi-
dential address calling upon "interested private citizens to undertake a thorough study
of the adequacy of existing procedures for the resolution of disputes arising out of con-
sumer transactions," was organized as a non-profit corporation in the District of Colum-
bia in the summer of 1971. During its two-year tenure, the Institute's work focused on
the problems facing consumers who suffered economic loss by paying for defective or
misrepresented goods or services. See REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRmvEWcss, THE NATIONAL.
INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE xi-xii (1973).
* See supra note 7. Section 123 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 152 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1970)), allowed the Federal Re-
serve Board to "exempt from the requirements of this part [15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-65 (1970)]
any class of credit transactions within any State if it determines that under the law of
that State that class of transactions is subject to requirements substantially similar to
those imposed under this part, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement,"
thereby applying pressure on the states to revise their consumer credit laws. For a trea-
tise extensively dealing with the evolution of state legislative regulation of consumer
credit (traditional state creditors'-rights law), see B. CuamN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER
CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965).
*7 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1982). The holder in due course doctrine was one of the principal
devices relied upon by finance companies to assure payment by a consumer despite con-
sumer dissatisfaction with a purchase. Under this longstanding doctrine, a seller's negoti-
ation of a purchaser's note to a third party qualifying as a holder in due course generally
prevented the purchaser from asserting any defenses to nonpayment. The FTC's rule
effectively abolished the doctrine in most consumer credit transactions. See Benson &
Squillante, The Role of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Consumer Credit Trans-
actions, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 440-42 (1974); Randolph & Whitman, The Last Nail in
the Coffin of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 311, 311-12, 327-31
(1977).
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Bankruptcy Reform Act must have seemed innocuous. The Code
was a significant, though not radical, departure from that pro-
posed by a respected Commission.2" To the extent that it has
proved to be contrary to the interests of secured creditors, it has
been so not because a specific lobbying group set out to attack
secured creditors. Rather, the most serious injury to creditor in-
terest probably will come through a combination of and a rela-
tively subtle interaction among various parts of the Code. Nev-
ertheless, it seems unlikely that the Code could be passed today,
or that it could have been passed at any time prior to 1978.
Against that short history consider my thesis. First, I main-
tain that a series of changes in the law since 1965 have substan-
tially reduced the personal property secured creditors' rights.
Second, I argue that we are about to enter upon the second part
of the historic cycle in which clever creditor lawyers devise novel
ways of doing business, and creditors adopt new practices to
minimize the impact of the law's change. Because we are not yet
deeply into this phase, I necessarily will be guessing, not only
about some of the consequences of the new law, but about the
creditors' response to them.
Specifically, I will address six recent changes, some in the
bankruptcy rules, some through the Code, and one through case
law, that have diminished the rights of secured creditors. The
first is the operation of the automatic stay. Second is the
debtor's right to use and sell the creditors' collateral provided
only that he gives adequate protection. Third is the debtor's ca-
pacity to impose a plan or reorganization on an unconsenting
secured creditor in Chapter 13 or 11. Fourth are the expanded
avoidance powers. Fifth is the expansion of the jurisdiction and
reach of the bankruptcy court, and finally are the recent cases
" The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was created by
Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 9i-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). For abrief d- -,,cuon of its
origins and findings, see Kennedy, Background and Overview of the Bankruptcy Code of
1978, in THE BANKRUpTcY REFORM Act oF 1978 3-8 (C. Holmes ed. 1979); Kennedy,
Foreward, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 381-87 (1973).
Although the Bankruptcy Code as passed does not bear any strong resemblance to
the Commission's draft, many of the Commission's suggestions were preserved. See P.
MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.05 (1980). See generally, Kennedy,
Background and Overview of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, in THE BANKRuT'rcy REFORm
AcT OF 1978 3-7 (C. Holmes ed. 1979).
[VOL. 53
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that apply fraudulent conveyance law to foreclosure sales. In the
second portion of the article I will identify six ways in which
secured creditors may be expected to respond to these events.
A. The Automatic Stay
Prior to the last decade, no comprehensive automatic stay
applied to secured creditors' collection activities upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.' The burden was upon the debtor in
possession or the trustee to prove his basis for a restraining or-
der and to convince the court to grant him one.30 While the
courts clearly had jurisdiction to restrain creditor activity upon
the filing of any petition in bankruptcy,3' in practice it appears
9 See Martin, Creditor Alternatives to Obtain Relief from Automatic Stays in
Bankruptcy, 87 CoM. L.J. 22, 23 (1982). No automatic stay of any kind operated in liqui-
dation proceedings and only some Chapter proceedings provided for even limited auto-
matic stays. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.01(2) (rev. 15th ed. 1983). The filing of
a bankruptcy petition triggered an automatic stay only in Chapter XII and even then
was effective only against in rem actions. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 428, 11 U.S.C. § 828
(1970) (repealed 1978). An automatic stay also existed in Chapter X proceedings, but did
not become effective until the petition was approved - an event that might occur imme-
diately in a voluntary case but could take much longer. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 141,
148, 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 548 (1970) (repealed 1978). Even these limited automatic stays
were of dubious importance because the petitions filed under these Chapters accounted
for a very small portion of all bankruptcy petitions filed. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981 § 539 (102d ed. 1981). Discretionary
stays were permitted at various stages of the proceedings in bankruptcy actions other
than straight bankruptcy. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 77(j), 83(c), 113, 116(4),
314, 614, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(j), 403(c), 513, 516(4), 714, 1016 (1970) (repealed 1978).
30 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.01(2) (rev. 15th ed. 1982). The promulgation of
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in the early seventies shifted the burden to the cred-
itor by imposing an automatic stay operative upon the filing of a debtor's petition for
relief under various Chapters, including the most commonly used form of debtor rehabil-
itation - Chapter XI. See 11 U.S.C. Bankr. R. 401, 601, 8-501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43,
13-401 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1978); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1981 § 539 (102d ed. 1981). Creditors rather than debtors thereafter
were obliged to go to court for appropriate relief. See Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under
the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3, 4 (1978).
31 See Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 177,
190-91 (1978); Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reor-
ganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 18 (1974); Peitzman &
Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief from the Automatic Stays in Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1216, 1219-23 (1977). In addition to general in-
junctive powers to restrain creditors, the Bankruptcy Act explicitly made several provi-
sions for issuance of stays at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of
1898, §§ 77(j), 83(c), 113, 116(4), 314, 614, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(j), 403(c), 513, 516(4), 714,
1983]
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that the presence of injunction power was far less threatening to
a secured creditor than an automatic stay that bears similar con-
tempt powers."2 Because the stay was not automatic, different
standards were applied by different courts in determining
whether the debtor or trustee had carried his burden. s Whether
to grant such an order rested with the discretion of the bank-
ruptcy judge, and one can safely conclude that many debtors did
not receive restraining orders in circumstances where the auto-
matic stay would have applied. Perhaps an even larger number
of creditor activities were not stayed because the debtor or trus-
tee failed to ask for a stay.34
Between 1973 and 1976, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
incorporated automatic stays throughout the various types of
proceedings similar to the single one now found in section 362 of
the Code. 85 Because Chapter XI was the most widely used busi-
ness reorganization provision and because it provided for no stay
whatsoever before the enactment of Rule 11-44, enactment of
that rule was by far the most important.
In theory, and occasionally in fact, the presence of the stay
does not diminish the amount a secured creditor will receive out
of the bankrupt estate.3 If the value of the collateral exceeds
1016 (1970) (repealed 1978).
, See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 362.01-.03 (rev. 15th ed. 1983).
33 See P. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 6.14 (1980); Kennedy, The
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 177, 238-39 (1978).
" Several commentators, however, have speculated that seeking a blanket stay at
the outset of bankruptcy proceedings, especially Chapter proceedings, was a very wide-
spread practice and that a stay in one form or another was frequently granted. See 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.01(2) (rev. 15th ed. 1983); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay
in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 177, 190 n.78 (1978).
35 See supra note 7. In contrast to the Bankruptcy Act, the automatic stays pro-
vided by both the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code immediately arise upon the filing of a petition regardless whether the petition was
voluntary or involuntary; the Chapter XII automatic stay could arise only in voluntary
cases. While the stay against liens in straight bankruptcy cases was less comprehensive
than that applicable in debtor rehabilitation cases under the Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure, section 362 applies equally to all bankruptcy proceedings. See Kennedy, Automatic
Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3, 4-5 (1978); Kennedy,
The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 177, 177 (1978).
36 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-44, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-301. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5835-37. See also Banker's Life Ins. Co. v.
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the debt upon the filing of the petition by an amount greater
than the interest that the creditor would have collected during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, section 506(b) of
the Code will allow the creditor to receive that interest together
with his collateral or its value.
In many cases the stay, together with the principle that an
undercollateralized creditor does not receive interest pending
the outcome of the bankruptcy, will mean that the secured cred-
itor will ultimately receive less than he would have had his col-
lateral been handed over to him on the date the petition was
filed. Assume, for example, that the prime interest rate is 15%,
that our hypothetical creditor is owed one million dollars, and
that the collateral is worth exactly one million dollars. If the
bankruptcy drags on for a year before there is dissolution, our
creditor will have lost his $150,000 of interest because he re-
ceives no interest unless he is oversecured.7 Although he might
have loaned to another at 15% for that period, he will probably
receive nothing for the opportunity cost of losing the use of his
money for the year's time. 8 Thus the very presence of the stay,
Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 807-08 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1981).
0' The claim of an undersecured creditor is divided into two parts; it is a secured
claim to the extent of the collateral's value, but any claim in excess of that amount is a
separate unsecured claim. Interest on the debt is allowed only to the extent the value of
the collateral exceeds the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V
1981). See also Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner
Indus.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (undersecured creditor not entitled
to receive interest); In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 826-27 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) (interest provision held applicable only to oversecured claims).
" See Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1163 n.57 (1981). Whether a secured creditor will be compen-
sated for his "opportunity cost" depends upon the court's perception of the nature of
adequate protection. Most courts, especially bankruptcy courts, view adequate protection
as solely intended to protect the secured creditor against any decrease in the value of his
collateral during the interim between the filing of the petition and confirmation of a
plan. See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner
Indus.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1009 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); General Elec. Mortgage Co. v.
South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 989 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982);
In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 823 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
These courts take the position that because adequate protection is not meant to main-
tain a secured creditor in the position he could have been in but for the intervention of
the stay, or to protect either the value of money or any existing equity cushion, the
secured creditor with collateral appreciating or remaining constant in value has gotten
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first widely used under rule 11-44 promulgated in 1974, and now
applicable via section 362 to all forms of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, will have a deleterious impact upon the secured creditor.
This change first came about by rule, but one should not
minimize the impact of the Congressional enactment of the sub-
stance of the rule. Section 362 is now in the statute for all to see;
it is the topic of continuous discussion in continuing education
courses and in the bankruptcy literature, and it is the subject of
untold cases.89 Doubtless this new-found prominence has
brought it to the attention of debtors' lawyers, trustees in bank-
ruptcy, and others who will assert its protection but who might
have never sought the protection of a rule.
B. Debtor's Retention, Use, and Sale of Collateral
Section 363 of the Code explicitly authorizes the debtor in
possession to "enter into transactions, including the sale or lease
of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business,
without notice or a hearing" and to "use the property of the es-
tate in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hear-
ing."'40 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
the debtor in possession probably had rights similar to those ex-
pressed in section 363 in Chapter X proceedings but that was
the benefit of his bargain and is entitled to nothing more. See, e.g., General Elec. Mort-
gage Co. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. at 994; In re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. at 827. One court has found that oversecured
creditors eventually get their "opportunity cost" through the operation of section 506(b)
and suggested that creditors concerned about undue delay should seek dismissal of the
petition or conversion to liquidation proceedings. See In re Pine Lake Village Apartment
Co., 19 Bankr. at 827.
Other courts have focused more specifically on language in the legislative history
indicating that a secured creditor should receive in value "essentially what he bargained
for." These courts note that were it not for the stay, the creditor would foreclose and
thus have the use of his money at current market rates. They argue that because part of
what the creditor bargained for was the return of his money at a specified time, he is
entitled to compensation for the loss of the use of his money during the interim period
between the filing of the petition and confirmation. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Monroe Park (In re Monroe Park), 17 Bankr. 934, 940 (D. Del. 1982); United Virginia
Bank v. Virginia Foundry Co. (In re Virginia Foundry Co.), 9 Bankr. 493, 498 (W.D. Va.
1981).
S9 A search for cases dealing with section 362 and containing the words "automatic
stay" showed 518 cases between January 1, 1982 and April 1, 1983.
40 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 363(c)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(v) (Supp. V 1981).
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not true either in the most common form of reorganizations,
Chapter XI proceedings, or in liquidations." Although the court
could stay a creditor's repossession in Chapter XI and presuma-
bly permit the use of equipment pending the outcome of the re-
organization, its right to authorize the sale of collateral or any
serious use that might cause depreciation was far from certain.
Thus, the bold and explicit assertion of such rights in all forms
of bankruptcy proceedings greatly strengthens the debtor's hand
in negotiating with the creditor over the use and sale of such
collateral.
Under section 363 the debtor in possession may use the col-
lateral out of the ordinary course or make sales out of the course
" The bankruptcy court's power to sell assets, either subject to or free from liens,
was well established under the Bankruptcy Act and its Rules as well as in the accompa-
nying case law. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 70(f), (g), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970) (repealed
1978); 11 U.S.C. Bankr. R. 606 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1978); Wright v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938); Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 116, 135
(1875). While Chapter X and Chapter XII had statutory language in sections 257 and
507 that permitted ouster of secured creditors in possession, early cases were hesitant
regarding the use of cash proceeds such as rent. See, e.g., Crystal v. Green Point Say.
Bank (In re Franklin Garden Apartments, Inc.), 124 F.2d 451, 454 (2d Cir. 1941); Na-
tional Builders Bank v. Schwartz (In re Moulding-Brownell Corp.), 101 F.2d 664, 666
(7th Cir. 1939). During the early 1950's two circuit courts gave thorough consideration to
the use of collateral issue with divergent results. In Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan,
185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950), the First Circuit ordered a turnover of the collateral based
on a strong showing that the secured creditor's position would be safeguarded and en-
hanced. 185 F.2d at 798. The Second Circuit adopted a somewhat more restrictive ap-
proach two years later, permitting use of collateral only when there is "a high degree of
likelihood (a) that the debtor can be reorganized in accordance with the Act, within a
reasonable time, and (b) the secured creditors whose security is being compulsorily
loaned will not be injured." In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703, 706-07 (2d
Cir. 1952). Subsequent decisions recognizing the difficulty in determining the likelihood
of successful reorganization at the outset of proceedings substantially eroded the "Third
Avenue Test." See, e.g., In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 545 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir.
1976); Central R.R. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 421 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949 (1970). In addition, two Second Circuit Chapter X decisions
permitting continued use of depreciating collateral raised grave doubt as to the viability
of Third Avenue. See In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971); Fruehauf
Corp. v. Yale Express Sys. (In re Yale Express Sys.), 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1967).
Finally, some Chapter XI cases permitted the continued use of collateral such as inven-
tory and accounts receivable but only so long as the secured creditor's rights were pre-
served. See Citicorp Business Credit, Inc. v. Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc. (In re Blazon
Flexible Flyer, Inc.), 407 F. Supp. 861, 863-64 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (accounts receivable); In
re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 537, 542-47 (D. Me.
1976).
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only after a notice and hearing.42 Both the right to use and to
sell are dependent upon the capacity of the debtor to give the
secured creditor "adequate protection" as that term is defined in
section 361. If the debtor in possession can convince the court
that his proposal affords "adequate protection," the debtor may
proceed on his merry way without significant interference from
the secured creditor.
In theory, adequate protection under section 361 should
leave the secured creditor in no worse position upon dissolution
or the proposal of a plan than he would have been had he re-
ceived his collateral on the day the petition was filed. In fact,
one suspects that it is only by chance that the secured creditor
will be left in an identical position after the passage of time. A
variety of the forms of adequate protection that have been ap-
proved by the courts depend upon hotly debated court determi-
nations of the "value" of the collateral. For example, it is now
commonplace for courts to refuse to lift the stay and to find that
a secured creditor has "adequate protection" because there is an
"equity cushion. '43 Because the value of collateral exceeds the
debt, the court finds that the secured creditor will lose nothing
by waiting. Obviously, if the court proves to be wrong about the
value, or if the collateral depreciates more rapidly than the court
expects, the secured creditor will be worse off at the conclusion
than he would have been had he received the collateral at the
41 The "notice and a hearing" required before cash collateral can be utilized by a
trustee does not mean that an actual hearing must be held. 11 U.S.C. ]!e 102(1) (Supp. V
1981). See also In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 Bankr. 350 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980).
13 See, e.g., In re Ware Spaces, Inc., 7 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 48 (Bankr. D. Hawaii
1980) (value $3.3 million; debt $2.4 million); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. 5-Leaf Clover
Corp. (In re 5-Leaf Clover Corp.), 6 Bankr. 463, 466 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980); City
Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Estates (In re San Clemente Estates), 5 Bankr. 605, 610
(Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1980); Heritage Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr.
679, 684-85 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (equity cushion of 17.4%); Vlahos v. Pitts (In re
Pitts), 2 Bankr. 476, 478-79 (Bankr. C. D. Calif. 1979) (equity cushion of 15.3%). But see
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12
Bankr. 803, 810-12 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (equity cushion analysis rejected when accrual
of interest would dissipate cushion within one year); Bamerical Mortgage & Fin. Co. v.
Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1153, 1156-57 (Bankr. D.
V.I. 1980) (automatic stay lifted despite equity cushion because of mobility and risk in-
herent in the operation of a seagoing vessel).
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outset." In other circumstances, the creditor stands to lose, be-
cause the debtor will have an opportunity to transform inven-
tory or equipment into cash or other liquid assets, and ulti-
mately to dissipate them in a vain attempt to continue the
operation of the business. That is a real possibility when the
debtor is permitted to use cash collateral, notwithstanding the
creditor's objection, or on the basis of an ex parte court order
procured without the representation of a lazy or distant creditor.
Although I know of no empirical data to prove that the
combination of sections 362, 363, and 361 leads to a lower return
for the secured creditor than it would have received had it pro-
ceeded under state law to repossess and resell the collateral, that
result seems inevitable. It is the hope of many business debtors
to be reorganized, to come upon the dawn of new business suc-
cesses. It is the dark reality that many Chapter l1's become
Chapter 7 liquidations."" That being the case, it is implausible
4 The general rule found in section 502(b)(2) states that no interest can be accrued
as part of an allowed secured claim after a petition has been filed. An exception is pro-
vided in section 506(b) whereby an oversecured creditor is allowed interest on his claim,
but only to the extent his claim is exceeded by the value of the collateral after recovery
of any reasonable necessary costs connected with the preservation or disposal of the col-
lateral. The amount of interest allowable under section 506(b) is not calculated until a
plan is confirmed or the collateral is sold and once accrued interest on an allowed se-
cured claim equals the amount of the excess, no further interest is allowable. Moreover,
at least some courts will refuse to lift the automatic stay on absence of adequate protec-
tion grounds merely because the excess is insufficient to cover accruing interest. See
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus. (In re American Mariner Indus.), 27
Bankr. 1004, 1007-1010 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Monroe Park (In re Monroe Park), 17 Bankr. 934, 937-41 (D. Del. 1982); Midlantic Nat'l
Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales (In re Anchorage Boat Sales), 4 Bankr. 635, 640-44
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). Thus, a creditor oversecured when bankruptcy proceedings com-
mence ultimately may discover that because the value of his collateral has not kept pace
with the accrual of interest and other expenses incurred by the estate, he is no longer
entitled to the compensation he originally anticipated.
"' The very fact of the huge amount of litigation under § 362 suggests at least se-
cured creditors believe they are being injured by its application.
46 For example, in the district of Utah, as of September 30, 1982, plans had been
confirmed in only 43 of the 251 cases that had been filed and pending for over six
months. Probably most of the remaining 208 cases (84%) have been or will be converted
into Chapter 7 liquidations. See In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 Bankr. 1014, 1022, 1022
n.18 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
For a sampling of cases that started out as Chapter 11's and have since become
Chapter 7 liquidations, see Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org. (In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.), 699 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.
1983]
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that most collateral will expand in value during the final desper-
ate days of a business slipping from reorganization into
liquidation.
C. Cramdowns, Chapter 11 and 13
Under Chapter 13 plans and Chapter 11 reorganizations, the
debtor essentially has the power to force any given secured cred-
itor to forego its right to repossess in return for a promise, se-
cured by the collateral, which in the court's judgment has the
same present value as the value of the collateral. Thus if the
court concludes that a creditor with a two million dollar debt
has collateral worth one million dollars, it has the power to ap-
prove a plan over the creditor's objection under which the credi-
tor would receive a series of periodic payments whose present
value would amount to one million dollars.
In Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcies, the
cramdown provisions operate together with section 722. That
section specifically allows the debtor to redeem certain personal
property, usually an automobile, by paying the secured creditor
the current value of the asset. Although a Chapter 7 debtor may
have to provide a lump sum equal to that value,48 the debtor
1983); Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re Comcoach Corp.), 698 F.2d 571
(2d Cir. 1983); Fanelli v. Hensley (In re Triangle Chemicals), 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.
1983); Ohio v. Kovacs (In re Kovacs), 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982); Earl Realty v. Leo-
netti (In re Leonetti), 28 Bankr. 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Pearlstein v. Small Business Ad-
ministration, 27 Bankr. 153 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Kopelman v. Halvajian (In re Triangle Lab-
oratories, Inc.), 663 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981); Superscope, Inc. v. Brookline Corp., No. 81-
980-Z (D. Mass. January 25, 1983) (available on Lexis, Bankr. library, Cases file); Levine
v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood (In re Evanston Motor Co.), 26 Bankr. 998 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Vogel v. Triangle Equip. Co. (In re Triangle Equip. Co.), 26 Bankr. 175 (W.D. Va.
1982).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. V 1981); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (Supp.
V 1981). The statement in the text is not precisely accurate, for creditors in Chapter 11
may elect for treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). A creditor so elect-
ing gives up the right to be treated as an unsecured creditor to the extent that he is
"undersecured," but the creditor retains a security interest in the collateral equal to the
full amount of the debt. Thus, at least in some Chapter 11 cases, a secured creditor may
avoid the consequences of an unfair cramdown by foregoing its unsecured claim and
clinging to the collateral (in rem) in the hope his evaluation of the collateral is ultimately
proven correct.
6 The legislative history is somewhat unclear whether lump sum payment is re-
quired. See Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 306-07 (1979)
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under Chapter 13 can effectively force the creditor to continue
to finance his purchase of the automobile. Formerly, the secured
creditor could insist that the debtor pay the entire amount of
the indebtedness to retain the automobile."9 In the absence of
restrictions regarding reaffirmation such as those now found in
section 524(c), he often would receive a reaffirmation by the
debtor for the full amount of the debt.50 In effect, the debtor
would have concluded that his automobile or other asset was
worth more to him than to an independent third party. Section
722, in conjunction with Chapter 13 and section 524, deprives
the secured creditor of the right to hold out for that higher sub-
jective value allocated to the asset by a particular debtor.
These provisions are perhaps the most radical and impor-
tant departure from the law and practice existing prior to the
Code. Although cramdowns were possible under Chapters X and
XII and in railroad reorganizations prior to the enactment of the
Code,5' few businesses and no consumer debtors found them-
selves in such reorganizations.2 Section 1129's application of the
cramdown to all business reorganizations, and section 1325's ap-
plication to all Chapter 13 cases, applies a doctrine that formerly
related to a minuscule percentage of all bankruptcies to the core
(citing H. Doc. 95-595 at 127, 380).
49 U.C.C. § 9-506 (1972).
o See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 162-64, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6088, 6123-25. Estimates of the number of reaffirmations vary,
but one study found that over one-third of those going through straight bankruptcy
agreed to reaffirmation of at least some of their debts with nearly half doing so because
they wanted to keep the asset; another third said they wanted to pay the creditor. See D.
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 59-62 (1971). In another
study, over half of those going through bankruptcy had agreed to reaffirmations of debts.
See H. JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 109-10 (1969). Once made, such a reaffirmation was
enforceable. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 524.03 (15th ed. 1979).
W Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 77(b), 216(7), 461(11), 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(b), 616(7),
861(11) (1970) (repealed 1978).
53 For instance, in the year ending June 30, 1979-the last full year the judiciary
operated under the Bankruptcy Act-226,476 bankruptcy estates were filed. Only 669
were Chapter XII petitions, 63 were Chapter X proceedings, and none were railroad reor-
ganizations. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981
539 (102d ed. 1981). Chapter X was exclusively for corporate debtors while Chapter XII's
purpose was to provide much the same relief for individual debtors with respect to real
property arrangements as Chapter X furnished corporate debtors. See 1 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 0.07 (rev. 14th ed. 1974).
1983]
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of bankruptcy practice, namely consumer plans and business re-
organizations. Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, courts
had no jurisdiction to deal with the claims of secured creditors."
While a court might manipulate the stay to induce a secured
creditor to take part de facto in the plan, there was no statutory
basis for forcing an unwilling secured creditor to take part. Pre-
sumably one who waited out the stay had a right to the return of
his collateral. There was no authority in Chapter XIII to
cramdown, although a secured creditor could agree to a plan.
5
4
Why does this power to "cramdown" diminish the creditor's
rights? In effect, it deprives the secured creditor of that incre-
ment of value which inheres in the collateral because of the
debtor's particular need for, or relation to, that collateral. In the
crudest case, assume that the secured creditor has a secured in-
terest in the debtor's hunting dog. The dog is a mongrel; it will
have no value on the market. Presumably therefore, a plan prob-
ably could be approved under which the dog was given to the
debtor without any payment whatsoever. That is so despite the
fact that the debtor would pay a large sum to keep his hunting
dog. Not only might he have an affection for the dog, but he may
also have trained the dog to make it uniquely suited to his hunt-
ing habits. In effect, the dog has value to the debtor that it has
to no other person. This same example can be played out, once
removed, if one considers the debtor and his special relationship
to his Corvette. Not only may he have a particular affection for
this car, but he also knows its idiosyncracies, understands what
the noise is when it hits 60 m.p.h., and appreciates the care he
5. See Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief from the Auto-
matic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1216, 1222-23 (1977).
" The treatment of secured claims under Chapter XIII varied widely among the
various judicial districts. In part, this was due to the ambiguous language of the statute
providing in section 646(2) that, a plan "may include provisions dealing with secured
debts severally, upon any terms" while also in section 652(1) prohibiting confirmation of
any plan until accepted in writing "by the secured creditors whose claims are dealt with
by the plan." While some courts permitted slight modifications of secured creditors'
rights, most found no cramdown authority. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1325.01[2][E][1] (rev. 15th ed. 1983); Countryman, Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans:
Past, Present and Future, 18 CATH. U. L. REv. 275, 286 (1968); Poulos, The Secured
Creditor in Wage Earner Proceedings: Dream versus Reality, 44 J. NAT'L CONF. REF.
BANKR. 68, 69 (1970).
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has taken of the automobile. For all these reasons, it may be
worth more to him than it is to a third party. Yet the court in
Chapter 13 will apply a bluebook value to that automobile, not
the higher value the debtor is likely to ascribe to it.55 Going one
step further, there are many similar cases in which a business
debtor undergoing reorganization has a particular need for or
knowledge of specific inventory or equipment. Because of that,
the debtor would be willing to pay a substantially higher amount
to retain that equipment than a third party would be willing to
pay for it on the market. In all of these cases the probable effect
of the cramdown is to deprive the secured creditor of that addi-
tional increment of value.
The second and equally important consequence of the
cramdown authority is to expand the court's discretion and to
allow the court to use it in ways that may be injurious to the
creditor's interest. First, the court must determine the value of
the collateral, and second, it must determine the value of the
56 While some courts have recognized that assets such as automobiles may have
value to the debtor higher than any measure of market value, they do not take that
incremental subjective value into account when determining the value of the collateral
and the concomitant amount of the allowed secured claim; at most the retail replacement
cost is utilized. See Ford Motor Credit v. Miller (In re Miller), 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
410, 412 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (median between wholesale and retail replacement cost
is appropriate valuation because it reflects the open market between private parties).
Indeed, some courts appear determined not to take into account the debtor's special
attachment to the asset. See GMAC v. Willis (In re Willis), 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
1101, 1109 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (average trade-in value is generally appropriate valua-
tion for automobiles because it reflects what a reasonably willing buyer not under com-
pulsion to buy would pay to a reasonably willing seller not under duress to sell). In
Willis, the auto in question had been purchased only two weeks prior to the filing of the
petition; therefore, the court refused to apply the general evaluation standard because it
believed the original contract price constituted better evidence of what a willing buyer
would pay and a willing seller would accept. Id. One measure of valuation used by sev-
eral courts is the amount that could be realized upon disposition in a commercially rea-
sonable manner, sometimes taking special notice of the creditor's business or usual
means of collateral disposal. See Savloff v. Continental Bank (In re Savloff), 6 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 349, 350 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Jones (In re Jones),
6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 965, 967 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Adams, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1234, 1235 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). In an effort to keep things administratively
manageable, some courts simply use the bluebook wholesale value. See In re Crockett, 6
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 226, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1980); In re Adams, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 1234, 1235 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (Supp. V
1981).
1983]
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periodic payments typically given to replace the collateral. The
appellate courts are likely to show little interest in redressing
factual errors in determining value of collateral or present value
of a stream of payments. Thus, one can assume that secured
creditors will be made to live with the judgment of the bank-
ruptcy trial judge.
In passing one should consider the argument that can be
made to suggest that cramdown power is really no change. Be-
cause secured creditors were always willing to negotiate in such
circumstances, is there no change? I think not. Formerly a
Chapter XI secured creditor could threaten to take his collateral
and go home once the stay was lifted. Under the current system,
that will be a hollow threat because the debtor in possession can
use the cramdown. By substantially changing the likely legal
outcome on failure of negotiation, the enactment of these expan-
sive cramdown rules reorders the negotiating power of the par-
ties. Moreover, in the consumer context, section 524's restric-
tions on reaffirmation back up the cramdown rules.
In summary, the consequences of the various cramdown
rules are to grant the bankruptcy court jurisdiction and discre-
tion to determine the value not only of the collateral but also of
the future payments, second, to deprive the secured creditor of
the "personal" increment of value ascribed by the debtor to the
collateral, and in sum, substantially to reallocate the negotiating
power among the parties.
D. Avoidance Powers
Reading the cases and talking with those actively involved
in bankruptcy practice, one concludes that the avoidance powers
are far less significant th .an provisions such as the cramdown and
the automatic stay. Nevertheless, the trustee's avoidance powers
have been expanded by the Code in a number of respects. For
instance, section 547 on preferences removes the requirement
that the trustee prove that the creditor who received a prefer-
ence had reasonable cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent.
Further, the Code provides a presumption of insolvency during
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the ninety days prior to the filing of the petition.56 In addition,
it subjects "insider" preferences to attack even though they oc-
curred as long as one year before the petition was filed.57 Section
547 also explicitly provides for attacking after-acquired property
in a way that did not previously exist.58 The only concessions to
the secured creditor are the codification of certain common law
exceptions to preferences" and the substitution of a ninety-day
rule for the four-month rule of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.60
The net consequence of these changes is enhancement of
the power of the trustee to set aside transfers. Under current
law, the trustee will never lose a suit because he is unable to
prove that the creditor who received a transfer lacked a reasona-
ble cause for believing the debtor insolvent or that the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Now the creditor bears
the burden of proving the debtor not insolvent.
Other provisions will have a modest, though perhaps signifi-
cant effect on certain kinds of secured creditors. Section
544(a)(3) now allows the trustee to set aside unrecorded real es-
tate mortgages that he could not attack under the law of many
states prior to the Code.
Finally, section 522(f)(2) voids nonpurchase money nonpos-
sessory security interests in certain consumer goods."' Thus, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 547(f), 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. V 1981).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 547(b)(4)(B), 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. V
1981).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, §§ 547(c)(15), 547(e), 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(c)(5),
547(e) (Supp. V 1981). This paragraph codifies the "improvement in position" test,
thereby overruling decisions such as DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969),
and Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). Thus if a secured creditor improves his position by
acquiring a lien on additional after-acquired receivables and inventory during the ninety
days preceding bankruptcy while making no new matching advance, there is a voidable
preference to the extent that the security interest increased in value.
" Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 547(c)(1)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)(4) (Supp. V
1981). See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.37, 547.40 (rev. 15th ed. 1983).
" Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 547(b)(4)(A), 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1981) with Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)
(1970) (repealed 1978).
' The full text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under
1983]
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classical security interest taken by the small loan company in
the debtor's furniture and other household goods, which is
neither possessory nor a purchase money security interest, is set
aside by section 522.
E. Reach of the Bankruptcy Courts
If one accepts the view that bankruptcy courts are generally
less sympathetic to secured creditors' claims than state courts,62
one finds an independent and significant injury to the secured
creditor's interest simply because the secured creditor is now
more likely than in the past to find himself before the bank-
ruptcy court. Are the bankruptcy courts more hostile to secured
creditors' interests than are the state courts? For a variety of
reasons that is a plausible hypothesis. Not only will a bank-
ruptcy judge be armed with the avoidance powers discussed
above, he will also be more familiar than a state court judge with
the various potential defects in the secured creditors' claims.
Unlike the state court judge who must simply determine the
narrow dispute before him, the bankruptcy judge is directed to
find a way to reorganize the debtor or to make a plan under
which the debtor can pay off some significant part of his debts. 3
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is -
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any -
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are
held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor
or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor.
A highly unscientific sampling of the opinions of creditors' lawyers tells me that
secured creditors view the bankruptcy court as a more hostile forum Ma.ni state courts.
Partly this is because of the specific avoidance powers and because of the powers such as
the automatic stay. An articulate spokesman for this view is Paul Festerson. In his arti-
cle, Equitable Powers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Protection of the Debtor and the
Doomsday Principle, 5 CREIGHTON L. REv. 221, 226 (1972), Festerson argues that the
courts of bankruptcy have asserted or will assert whatever power is necessary to be exer-
cised in an "altogether discretionary" way to achieve the goals deemed by them to be
appropriate.
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981); see also Waxman, A Solution to the Bank-
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If he is true to that mission, he will often come in conflict with
the secured creditors' interest, for the typical secured creditor
will seek to deprive the estate of assets that may be critical to
the reorganization. Finally, there may be deeper reasons, buried
in the mode of selection of bankruptcy judges, that bring per-
sons to the bankruptcy bench who initially are more sympa-
thetic to the debtor's plight than are state court judges.
To some extent, Congress itself has given credence to the
view that the bankruptcy courts are more generous than state
courts. For example, in the 1970 amendments to sections 14 and
17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Congress required that
certain objections to discharge be presented in the bankruptcy
courts, not in the state courts." Likewise, the enactment of the
elaborate and difficult reaffirmation ritual in section 524 pre-
sumably is based in part on the assumption that the bankruptcy
judge will be solicitous of the debtor's interests.
There are two unrelated reasons why a secured creditor is
more likely to find himself before a bankruptcy judge under the
Code than formerly was the case. The most obvious is the ex-
pansion of jurisdiction" granting the bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion over all matters "arising in or related to" Title 11 cases and
over all property of the estate "wherever located." 6 Previously,
jurisdiction had been restricted to the core bankruptcy functions
such as litigation to recover the debtor's assets 7 and had not
been extended to such traditionally state law matters as prop-
erty damage or breach of contract."s Moreover, personal jurisdic-
ruptcy Court Conundrum, 69 A.B.A. J. 312, 312 (1983).
" The 1970 addition of § 17(c)(2), together with an amended § 14(f), provided that
a creditor objecting to a discharge under § 17(a)(2) (false pretenses, false representa-
tions, false financial statements, and willful and malicious conversion), § 17(a)(4) (fraud
or defalcation by an officer or a fiduciary), or § 17(a)(8) (other willful and malicious
injuries to person or property) must raise his objections in bankruptcy court within the
time fixed by the court; if he failed to raise the specified objections in that forum, he was
not permitted to do so elsewhere. For criticism of the draftsmanship of the 1970 amend-
ments, see Countryman, The New Discharge-ability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 25-27
(1971).
28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), (c) (Supp. V 1981).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 541(a), 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. V 1981).
' See Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARv. L. REv.
703, 712-13 (1982).
The legislative history of the statute expressly states that under the Bankruptcy
1983]
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tion under the Bankruptcy Act was essentially limited to actions
in rem and actions in which the defendant had consented to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 69 Putting aside the issues raised
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 70 any claim by the trustee to collateral, wherever located,
could now be asserted in the bankruptcy court rather than
through a private action in a state court.71 Assuming that the
Marathon dispute ultimately is resolved in a way consistent
with the drafters' intent,7 adversary proceedings of all kinds
will be heard before the bankruptcy court, not in state court as
formerly would be the case.
Code bankruptcy courts have "the broadest grant of jurisdiction to dispose of proceed-
ings that arise in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy code." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6400.
Case law reflects an embracement of the theory. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Hoopa Timber
Corp. (In re Colgrove), 3 Collier Bankr. Cas. 20 (MB) 839, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981)
(jurisdiction); Thompson v. First State Bank (In re Thompson), 3 Bankr. 312, 313
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1980) (jurisdiction over allegations of prepetition unlawful seizure of and
injury to debtors' property).
" See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 3.01[2][a] (rev. 15th ed. 1983). When property
was in the actual or constructive possession of a third person asserting a bona fide ad-
verse claim, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to summarily determine that per-
son's claim without his consent. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.05 (rev. 14th ed.
1978). Illustrative of this state of affairs is the secured creditor holding repossessed prop-
erty as a result of the exercise of self-help enforcement. The case law under the Bank-
ruptcy Code generally deals with these circumstances by finding the secured creditor to
be a "custodian" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(c) (Supp. V 1981) and thus
required to return the property to the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. V 1981).
See ABD Fed. Credit Union v. Williams (In re Williams), 6 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1219,
1220 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980). But see Flournoy v. City Fin. Inc., 679 F.2d 821, 822-24
(11th Cir. 1982). In any case, the mere presence of a third party holding under an ad-
verse claim of right no longer deprives the court of jurisdiction on that basis alone.
70 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. V 1981); see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY V 3.01[11[e]
(rev. 15th ed. 1983); Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court under the New Bankruptcy Law:
Its Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251, 276-77
(1979); Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy under the 78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 577, 580 (1980). Bankruptcy courts exercising the broad personal jurisdiction
granted by Congress have deemed themselves authorized to assert personal jurisdiction
over parties located anywhere within the United States. See Note, Bankruptcy and the
Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 703, 713-14 & n.57 (1982).
" See supra note 68; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6400 ("Actions that formerly had to
be tried in State court or in Federal district court, at great expense and delay to the
estate may now be tried in the bankruptcy courts.").
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The second and unrelated reason for the secured creditor to
find itself before the bankruptcy court concerns the many provi-
sions of the Code that now make bankruptcy more palatable
both to consumers and to business. For example, the expansion
of exemptions in section 522 and the capacity to be discharged
from virtually all debts of whatever nature under Chapter 13
now make bankruptcy a suitable alternative for many for whom
it would not have been acceptable prior to the Code. Likewise,
the cramdown provisions, the stay, and the fact that claims
(however contingent) can be resolved in bankruptcy, may bring
business debtors to court who formerly would have contented
themselves with private negotiations.7" The radical increase of
73 A quick examination of the discharge provisions of Chapter 13 and of the exemp-
tion provisions in § 522 shows why individuals who might not have declared bankruptcy
prior to the Code may now do so. It is much less obvious why the same might be true of
businesses. Doubtless, some businesses will choose Chapter 11 today who previously
would not have chosen either Chapter XI or Chapter X because of the expanded powers
that are given to the debtor in possession.
There is another class of business debtors that may find it desirable to file in Chap-
ter 11 under the Code and who would not have done so under the prior law. These are
debtors whose principal creditors are plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs in mass tort law
suits. A current and notorious example of this class is the Johns-Manville Corporation,
which filed a Chapter 11 petition in the Southern District of New York in 1982. See, e.g.,
Johns-Manville Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 7 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB)
1231 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Doan (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 Bankr. 919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (earlier opinion in same case on related
matters); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). Johns-Manville is but the most
prominent of these cases. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); In re UNR Industries, Inc., 23 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982). In addition,
the potential exists for a similar result in a variety of other cases where corporate defen-
dants are confronted with a large number of tort plaintiffs. None of these cases would
have found their way into the bankruptcy court under the old law.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as it existed in 1978) only provable and allowa-
ble claims were discharged. Certain claims, such as those arising out of intentional torts,
could not be proved and therefore were not discharged. Negligence claims could be
"proved" only if the debtor had been sued on the claims before the bankruptcy proceed-
ings were initiated. Even if the claim was provable, it was not allowable if it could not be
liquidated or reasonably estimated, or if that estimation would unduly delay the admin-
istration of the estate. Thus, under the Bankruptcy Act it was unlikely that a defendant
could escape liability even to plaintiffs who had filed suit; it was impossible that he
would escape liability to potential litigants.
Under the Code, Congress dispensed with the concept of provability. Moreover, it
directed the court to fix the value of all contingent and unliquidated claims, regardless of
their capacity for reasonable estimation. Thus, it became not a matter of discretion with
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consumer bankruptcies over the last several years is partly at-
tributable to the recession. A large part of that increase, how-
ever, must also be attributable to the new provisions that make
bankruptcy more palatable. 4
The combination of these events, expanded jurisdiction, and
the increased willingness of those to go into bankruptcy, means
that the secured creditor will now find itself more often than
before in front of a judge that is armed with avoidance power,
with the knowledge of creditors' foibles, with the directions to
foster reorganizations and protect debtors, and conceivably with
an anti-creditor bias.
F. Fraudulent Conveyance and Foreclosure Sales
One of the events that has large potential for diminishing
secured creditor rights rises from the cases, not from rules or
the bankruptcy court, but a matter of obligation to estimate such claims.
In circumstances such as existed in Johns-Manville, courts ultimately may refuse to
deal with most such claims. In the first place, courts may find that the more remote
claimants (those who have not filed suit and those who may have been exposed to asbes-
tos but show no symptoms of illness) are not yet "claimants," and thus are untouched by
the bankruptcy proceedings. Particularly with respect to those whose claims are remote,
there are important due process questions about whether one should permit one's rights
to be extinguished at a time when one may be ignorant of those rights. For a discussion
of some of the questions associated with estimating such claims, see Note, Procedures for
Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153
(1982).
7" In the twelve month period ending June 30, 1981, the first full statistical year
under the Bankruptcy Code, a total of 360,329 cases representing 518,152 estates were
commenced in bankruptcy courts. This was the largest number of bankruptcy estates
ever filed in one year and a 43.8% increase over the previous record high set in 1980.
Business bankruptcies also increased but remained in the same ratio to former total es-
tates. See 1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs 131-36. Using a regression model, one commentator calculates that the new
Bankruptcy Code may be directly responsible for as much as a third of the increase in
personal bankruptcy filings. See Kowalewski, Personal Bankruptcy: Theory and Evi-
dence, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. REv. 1 (Spring 1982); see also Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) (statement of Arthur F. Brimmer, Presi-
dent, Brimmer & Co., Economic and Financial Consultants); Evans & Johnson, Propos-
als for Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 37 Bus. LAW. 1117 (1982); Martin, Creditor Alter-
natives to Obtain Relief from Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy, 87 CoM. L.J. 22, 22
(1982). But cf. Petzinger, A Bankruptcy Boom, 2 CAL. LAW. 32, 36 (198.2) (describing
reluctance of businesses to file for bankruptcy even when it is their only hope).
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statutes. In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.,7 5
the Fifth Circuit applied the law of fraudulent conveyances in a
novel and potentially damaging way to foreclosure sales. In that
case, the trial court found the fair market value of the collateral
to be $200,000. Neither party challenged that finding on appeal,
but the trustee argued that the foreclosure sale for $115,400
(57.7% of the fair market value) was not "the fair equivalent"
for the transfer of that property. Consequently, he maintained
that it was voidable under section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Agreeing with that argument, the court suggested that anything
less than 70% of the fair market value would not be the fair
equivalent. That case has been followed in a subsequent Fifth
Circuit opinion, Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co.,
7 6
over the dissent of Judge Clark. It has been explicitly rejected
by the bankruptcy panel for the Ninth Circuit in Lawyers Title
Insurance Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid),7 and by several
other courts.78
Note first that Durrett can be applied just as readily under
the Code as under the Act of 1898. The important language in
section 67(b) appears now in section 548. Indeed, it may be eas-
ier to reach the result under the Code.79 Moreover, there is noth-
76 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
76 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981). It has also been followed unenthusiastically by some
bankruptcy courts. See Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co.
(In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates), 23 Bankr. 36, 39-40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)
(sale for 70% of fair market value held reasonably equivalent); Coleman v. Home Say.
Asa'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (sale for 28% of fair
value held not reasonable equivalent); Wickham v. United American Bank (In re
Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (sale for 80% of fair value held
reasonably equivalent).
21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23-24 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1982); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982); Murdock v. Plymouth Enterprises, Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23
Bankr. 969, 975 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20
Bankr. 988, 994-95 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
7 The most significant difference between the provisions of the old Bankruptcy Act
and those of the new Bankruptcy Code regarding constructively fraudulent conveyances
is the latter's elimination of any element of good faith in determining whether the debtor
received fair consideration. Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(d)(1), 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(11) (repealed 1978) with Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 548(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). An insolvent who receives less than reasonably equivalent
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ing that necessarily restricts Durrett to real estate foreclosures;
it would be just as easy to reach that result in the resale of an
asset under Article 9. If Durrett is generally accepted, nearly all
sales of repossessed collateral will be subject to attack under sec-
tion 548 if the debtor goes into bankruptcy within one year of
the sale. The trustee may be able to reach back beyond one year
by using section 544 and subrogating himself to one who would
have a claim under the state fraudulent conveyance law.
As Judge Clark points out in his dissent in Abramson, the
likely result of such a rule is to cause those who bid at foreclo-
sure sales to reduce their bids by some increment equal to the
probability that the debtor will go into bankruptcy and that
some trustee will make the buyer disgorge the property.
To the creditor such a consequence will mean that he will
place less reliance upon his collateral for two reasons. First, he
will expect to receive less on foreclosure than he would have oth-
erwise, because others will discount the price. Second, he can
expect to be embroiled in further litigation with the disap-
pointed buyer if the foreclosure sale is upset. The cases to date
do not elaborate the potential liability that the secured creditor
might have in such circumstances.80 In these instances it is con-
ceivable that the secured creditor will give an express or implied
warranty of title. Thus, it is possible that the disappointed
buyer would come back to the secured creditor and would insist
that the secured creditor take his position and pursue the claim
in the bankruptcy estate.
One can hope that the view of the bankruptcy panel for the
value-a concept that readily lends itself to mathematical formulation-for property has
made a fraudulent transfer; the state of mind of the transferee is not important. See 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 548.02[4] (rev. 15th ed. 1983).
80 Thus far, courts have focused on the rights of the trustee or debtor in possession
to recover the property transferred pursuant to § 550(a) and the rights of the disap-
pointed buyer under § 548(c) and § 550(d) to a lien on the property transferred at least
equal to the foreclosure price. They have not considered whether a disappointed buyer
may, in addition to or in lieu of enforcing the § 548(c) lien, impose liability on the se-
cured creditor for whose benefit the foreclosure occurred. See Gillman v. Preston Family
Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448-49 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Coleman v.
Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 836-37 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Smith
v. American Consumer Fin. Corp. (In re Smith), 21 Bankr. 345, 352 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988, 994-96 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982).
[VOL. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Miss. L.J. 416 1983
SECURED CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Ninth Circuit will prevail. It is far better to attack inappropriate
and unfair foreclosures frontally by asserting (a'la U.C.C. section
9-504) that they are not "commercially reasonable" than by
coming in the back door. The Durrett approach introduces un-
necessary uncertainty; by granting some unidentified court au-
thority to find the sale price was less than 70% of the "value," it
casts a cloud over virtually every foreclosure proceeding. At this
writing, there are two decisions by one court of appeals asserting
this idea; no other courts of equal status have addressed it. 81
II. CREDITOR RESPONSES
A. Introduction
If this combination of rules, cases, and the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 has significantly reduced credi-
tors' rights, one can be certain that creditors and their lawyers
are busy with schemes to recoup their losses. The nature of cred-
itor responses are important for a variety of reasons. They are
important to everyone actively involved in bankruptcy practice,
for they will tell us whether the rules that have been established,
as discussed above, will in fact apply or whether they will be
circumvented by the creditors' actions. They are important for
the economists because they will give some insight on the grand
question whether security is sufficient; they may also instruct on
a narrower question-whether the changes wrought by the Code
will produce a more efficient system than previously existed. For
similar reasons, the creditor responses are important to legisla-
tors, for only by assessing them can the legislator determine
whether the goal of greater equity and fairness has been
achieved and at what cost. Most significantly, the efficiency of
these responses are important to the creditors themselves. Se-
cured creditors ultimately may conclude that attempting to gain
security, or something like it, is so difficult and inefficient that
they may as well become unsecured creditors.
s Aside from the Madrid decision, all courts that have considered and rejected Dur-
rett's seventy percent rule have been bankruptcy courts. See supra notes 76-77 and ac-
companying text.
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One can easily visualize at least six creditor responses to the
events described in Part I of this paper. I do not argue that this
is an exclusive list; I am confident that it is not. Most of the
devices discussed below are now in use as security substitutes. I
suggest only that their use will become more widespread. His-
tory tells us, however, that one should not underestimate the
creditors' imagination. Surely they will devise modes of opera-
tion more intricate and elegant than any law professor could
conceive. Only time will reveal those to us; for now, consider six
possible responses.
First is the creditor's retention of ownership of assets that
might otherwise belong to the debtor. Examples are leasing and
consignment. Second is the possibility of the creditor's purchase
of assets from the debtor, classical factoring and perhaps more.
Third, one can expect the creditor to take a broader security in-
terest than before. Fourth, many creditors will insist upon a
guaranty in circumstances where one might not have been re-
quired before. Fifth, a combination of debtors and creditors may
attempt to allocate part of the cost to the taxpayers in the form
of government guarantees. Finally, secured creditors are likely to
charge higher rates in an attempt to offset the cost imposed by
their inability to enjoy the full value of their collateral.
B. Lease and Consignments
Leasing and consignments are two forms of purchase money
financing with a long history in the law of creditors' rights. For
many reasons creditors have often written security agreements
in the form of leases.8 2 If one writes this contract as a "true
"2 The initial reason, which may still have vitality, for writing a transaction as a
lease was to insure that the "lessee" would get a deduction as a business expense for the
full amount of his payment. If he were treated as a purchaser under the federal income
tax law, the lessee would have been entitled to a depreelattion deductin; that deduti .. n.
was often not as large as the full amount of the payment. Second, the debtor sometimes
may wish to lease rather than buy to avoid showing a liability on its balance sheet.
Third, a buyer may be prohibited from certain types of borrowing by agreements made
as part of earlier loans. In some circumstances, additional borrowing as a part of a
"purchase" transaction will violate these provisions, but a "lease" of the same asset will
not. Finally, there also may be state tax considerations for leasing. Note that the Uni-
form Commercial Code has accomodated to this problem by permitting those who wish
to characterize their transactions as leases nevertheless to file under § 9-408.
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lease," the legal rules that apply to it are unambiguous under
the Bankruptcy Code, under Article 9 of the UCC, and under
the common law of the various states. The same is not true of a
consignment. The Uniform Commercial Code inartfully deals
with consignment. It is not clear, to me at least, that one can
write a consignment that will not be treated as a security agree-
ment under Article 9. This uncertainty under the UCC is certain
to spawn additional uncertainty for the consignor under the
Code.
Turning first to the lease, what happens if the creditor
chooses to characterize himself as a lessor and to write his agree-
ment as a true lease? Both the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Code recognize him as such. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, a true lease is outside of Article 9; it simply constitutes a
contract with respect to goods, and it is enforceable according to
the common law of bailment of the particular state.83 Under the
Code, a lease typically would be treated under section 365, the
provision dealing with executory contracts and leases.
Upon the bankruptcy of the lessee, the lessee and his trus-
tee have two options. If they decide to reject the lease, they
must forfeit the goods to the lessor, who takes the goods and
may assert certain limited rights against the bankrupt estate as
an unsecured creditor. Note, however, there is no option or dis-
cretion on the part of the trustee to argue that the asset is worth
less than the lessor believes it to be worth, and thus, it may be
retained in a plan for payment equal to something less than the
lease payments. If the trustee or the debtor instead chooses to
assume the lease, he has the responsibility of curing any existing
default, " and then must comply with the lease, term by term.
The full amount of the payments provided for in the lease must
be made, and they must be made under the same schedule as
provided in the lease. To repeat, the court has no option such as
exists under section 1129 to conclude that the leased goods have
a value less than that represented by the payments provided
under the lease, and thus, to authorize lower payments or the
88 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 977 (2d ed. 1980).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 365(b)(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V
1981).
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same payments over a longer term.
In view of these provisions and the recognition of the les-
sor's right as an owner, some have suggested that those who for-
merly would have cast their transaction as a security interest
might now wish to write it as a true lease.8 5 In most circum-
stances, a true lease cannot have exactly the same economic con-
sequences and risks as a security agreement. In the classical
lease, the lessor assumes the risk that the leased goods will de-
preciate more rapidly than he contemplates at the outset; on the
other hand, the lessor also enjoys the benefit that arises from
appreciation in the leased goods. In a sale and security agree-
ment both the risk and benefit rest with the debtor. Typical
documents in current use as "leases" have some of the attributes
of a classical lease and some of the attributes of a standard se-
curity agreement. Should the lease be written for the entire use-
ful life of the collateral, or should it provide that the risk of ex-
cessive depreciation rests with the debtor, the lessor runs the
risk of having a court conclude that the "lease" is in fact a se-
curity agreement."s Thus to enjoy the benefits of section 365, the
See Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788,
790-92 (1982).
" If the lease is determined to grant a security interest that has not been perfected,
the creditor-would-be-lessor clearly loses to the trustee. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
be certain that a lease will not be held a security agreement because that is to be deter-
mined by the facts of each case. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972). When, at the end of the lease
term, the lessee gets the asset for no additional consideration, or at only token considera-
tion such as one or two dollars, the lease will be held a security agreement. See, e.g.,
Bolen v. Mid Continent Refrigerator Co., 411 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(lessee could receive title to refrigerator for $1 and sales tax; held security interest). The
mere presence or absence, however, of an option to purchase is not determinative
whether the device is held a lease or security interest. See, e.g., In re Tilery, 571 F.2d
1361, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (absence of purchase option not an obstacle to finding security
interest); In re Winston Mills, 6 Bankr. 587, 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (parties' intent
to be determined from economic substance of their agreement); Adelman v. GMAC (In
re Tuflsa Port Warehouse Co.), 4 Bankr. 801, 80b (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1980) (substance
considered over form to decide whether agreement constitutes lease or security interest);
Van Alphen v. Robinson, 420 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1979) (presence of purchase option does
not preclude device from being a lease).
In general, courts have tended to employ some form of an "economic realities" test
whereby a purported lease will be held a security interest if the only sensible business
decision at the end of the lease term would be to acquire the asset in question. See, e.g.,
Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 172 (10th Cir.
1976) (purchasing as lessee's only viable business choice); Citicorp Leasing v. Allied In-
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creditor may have to give up certain protections and accept cer-
tain risks that would not have been imposed upon him, at least
under the pre-Code bankruptcy law.
Arguably, section 2-326 is a substantive rule of law that as-
signs certain rights to the parties in any consignment transac-
tion. Specifically, section 2-326(2) provides, "goods held on sale
or return [i.e., on consignment] are subject to such [buyers',
creditors'] claims while in the buyers' possession." The section
provides that the consignor can buy protection against such
creditors by filing a financing statement. Section 9-114 of the
1972 amendments elaborates on those rights. That section con-
templates that certain consignments are "intended as security"
and others are not. Section 1-201(37), dealing with security in-
terests, specifies that even consignments not intended as "secur-
ity interests" are subject to the provisions under section 2-326.
The combination of these sections leaves considerable un-
certainty. Conceivably, section 2-326 is stating that, irrespective
of the parties' intent or the language of their agreement, the
consignee's creditors will have rights in the collateral superior to
those of the consignor unless there is a filing. In short, one can
read section 2-326 as a rule of substantive law to the effect that
any consignment is the conveyance of a property interest to the
consignee sufficient to give an interest in his creditors superior
to that of the consignor.8 7 Note, this is in" marked contrast to the
Uniform Commercial Code's application to true leases; it leaves
such questions to the common law of the state, which would find
the interest of the lessee's creditors subordinate to the lessor's
interest. On the other hand, one may read the references to con-
signments "intended as security" to mean that a carefully con-
structed consignment gives the consignee and his creditors no
greater rights than a lessee would have.
Under Article 9, if the consignor files a financing statement,
all of this is academic. By filing he gains superiority over other
stit. Distrib., 454 F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (lessee's only reasonable course
was to purchase; held, security agreement). Thus, to be as certain as possible that his
lease will not be held a security agreement, a creditor should charge the equivalent of the
fair market value of the asset at the end of the lease term.
"' See generally J. WHITE & R. Suzmis, UNIORt CO&inCrL CODE 883-88 (2d
ed. 1980).
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competitors. In bankruptcy, however, it is not academic. If we
treat the consignor merely as a secured creditor in bankruptcy,
he will then be subject to cramdowns under sections 1325 and
1129 of the Code. On the other hand, if we treat him as the true
owner of the property, subject only to a contract, there will be
no possibility of a cramdown and the debtor in possession will
obtain rights to the collateral only by adopting the contract
under section 365 of the Code and living up to all of its terms.
Presumably, the different treatment of consignments and
leases under the UCC is attributable in part to the fact that con-
signments were already a well-developed mode of financing at
the time the UCC was enacted, whereas leasing was not as
widely recognized as a financing substitute. Perhaps more im-
portant, the expectation of a competing creditor who sees goods,
apparently part of inventory but in fact on consignment, is dif-
ferent from the expectation of the creditor who sees goods in use
as equipment, and apparently on lease. Presumably, the former
has greater potential for misleading creditors than the latter.8 8 If
any possible misperception by competing creditors has been
solved by a public filing under Article 9, what is the basis in
bankruptcy for giving one treatment to consignments and an-
other to leases? I am uncertain that there is any. By hypothesis
both of these transactions are analogues to secured loans. If one
is treated more favorably than the other in bankruptcy, one can
expect creditors to adopt the more favorable mode.
It is possible that the differential treatment provided under
sections 1129 and 1325 cramdowns on the one hand, and under
section 365 (no cramdown) on the other, will send creditors scur-
rying for section 365 treatment. Doubtless this will produce a
new crop of cases on that tedious question: is this document a
true lease or merely a disguised security agreement? It will also
bring litigation on the status of consignments in bankruptcy,
" Equipment leasing is now so widespread that it is unlikely any sensible creditor
relies upon his debtor's possession of equipment as proof of ownership without first mak-
ing some inquiries concerning the extent of the debtor's ownership interest. Although
consignment has become more common, and it may sometimes be possible to charge a
creditor with knowledge of the consignment, the potential for being misled by appear-
ances is still greater than in equipment leasing. See R. SPEiDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHfTE,
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 254-57 (3d ed. 1981).
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and it may stimulate the imagination of creditors' lawyers to de-
vise forms of ownership that are not leases, nor consignments,
nor security agreements.
C. Purchasing Assets of the Debtor, Factoring
A second proposal that has recently been made to deprive
the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction and to free assets from the
automatic stay is to adopt the ancient practice of factoring."
Under a classical factoring arrangement, the creditor purchases
accounts receivable without recourse, takes possession of all the
documents, and makes collection directly from the account debt-
ors. If he does all of those acts and files a financing statement as
well, he has probably escaped the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. He has avoided any possibility that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy will be able to enjoy any appreciation in the value of the
collateral, and he has freed himself from the stay in section 362.
Attempts at factoring that preserve some elements of re-
course against the debtor are certain to face challenges by debt-
ors in possession and by trustees.9 To the extent that the pur-
chaser of accounts receivable retains a recourse right against the
debtor, the transaction takes on more of the colors of a loan and
less those of an outright purchase of specific assets. If factoring
is widely adopted in an attempt to avoid the automatic stay and
cramdown, we will see litigation about what "loan" elements can
be present in a factoring agreement and yet have it qualify as a
true factoring arrangement.
89 See Koch, Bankruptcy Planning for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788,
792-96 (1982); cf. Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 540 (3d
Cir. 1979) (court will look behind language of transaction to decide whether legal rights
and economic consequences of agreement are more like those of a sale or a financing
transaction).
"0 A court will have to consider whether an agreement is a true sale of accounts or
only a secured loan, a problem not unlike that faced with purported leases. Conceivably,
a court may rule that an assignor's retention of some legal or equitable interest in the
assigned accounts makes the transaction a secured loan. See, e.g., Major's Furniture
Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979) (transfer of customer receivables
by debtor found to be financing transaction); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Nixon Machinery
Co. (In re Nixon Machinery Co.), 6 Bankr. 847, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (assign-
ment of accounts with recourse declared security transaction); see also 11 U.S.C. §
541(d) (Supp. III 1979) and infra note 91.
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There will also be litigation about application of the stay in
certain circumstances where the disposal of the account is not
complete. Assume, for example, that a creditor purchases ac-
counts receivable and has no recourse against the debtor, but he
does not notify the account debtors. Assume that he executes an
agreement with the debtor to collect the accounts on his behalf.
Under this arrangement, presumably the debtor continues to
collect the accounts and periodically pays the proceeds over to
the creditor. Will the automatic stay prohibit such payment? It
would seem so. In that circumstance, will the automatic stay
prohibit the creditor from himself notifying the account debtors
and making collections after the petition? That is less clear. 1
Assuming that Congress has the constitutional power to do
so, 92 it seems highly unlikely that Congress has the will to enact
11 Section 541(d) of the Bankruptcy Code arguably addresses this point and renders
the factored accounts not part of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (Supp. III 1979). By
that section, Congress intended to permit a mortgagee to sell shares of his mortgages to
third parties and continue to service them. It is intended to grant the purchasers of such
mortgage interests priority over the trustee in bankruptcy of the seller. The case is pre-
cisely analogous to the one posed in the text. Although subsection (d) was stimulated by
the mortgage question, the language of the subsection would apply to other factoring
arrangements as well.
92 Congressional response to widespread factoring and leasing might take various
forms. Initially, Congress might simply amend § 365 to provide for the treatment of
leases under § 1129. Conceivably, Congress could enact a law that would purport to over-
ride contrary state rules. Such a law might provide that at least in bankruptcy, transac-
tions framed as "factoring" or "leases" under state law be regarded as security transac-
tions. If such a law applied only to transactions entered into after its effective date, it
would merely constitute a federal redefinition of the property rights of the persons who
entered into those transactions.
Consider some of the constitutional objections that would certainly be asserted if
Congress retroactively attempted to change the rights of lessors and factors. The most
obvious challenge is one under the taking clause of the 5th Amendment. Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982) sug-
gests that at least the conservative wing of the Supreme Court would be receptive to
such arguments.
Note that if the legislation were cast in the form, not of redefining the private prop-
erty rights that attach to a certain status, but rather that of redefining the form neces-
sary to achieve that status, the challenge would be more difficult. For example, Congress
might enact an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code that would state that a lease or
factoring transaction would have to have certain attributes in order to be recognized as a
true factoring agreement under the Bankruptcy Code. Even though it might be virtually
impossible to achieve that status, the Congressional subterfuge would make the challenge
much more difficult. A similar challenge might be based on the due process clause of the
5th Amendment. Even if Congress were quite unsubtle and simply purported to make a
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legislation to deprive the creditor of the power either of exercis-
ing a lessor's rights under the section above or of factoring, as
provided in the previous paragraphs. To prohibit those transac-
tions would require legislation that not only changes the sub-
stantive law concerning ownership interests, but also overrides
the explicit agreement of the debtor and creditor. Surely Con-
gress is unwilling to prohibit the debtor, even one on the verge
of bankruptcy, from making good faith disposals of his property.
Failing such a general prohibition, how could Congress prohibit
such a debtor from selling his accounts to another creditor? I
maintain that it would not do so. Moreover, Congress is unlikely
to wish to call into question all transactions that occur during
some short period prior to bankruptcy. To grant the bankruptcy
court the power to upset all such transactions, including those
retroactive change in the rights of factors and lessors, some maintain that there would be
no violation of the 5th Amendment. See Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the 5th Amendment
and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L. Rv. 973 (1983).
If Congress made such legislation only prospective, the constitutional challenge
would be more difficult. By hypothesis the "taking clause" requires that the injured
party have "something" to be taken. If Congress simply were to define the legal rights
attached to one who signed a lease or factoring agreement, and if one assumes that it had
the power to do so either under the commerce or the bankruptcy clauses, no taking
would have occurred. The congressional action in this case would be no different from
the routine and prospective redefinition of private property rights in a variety of circum-
stances by state legislatures. An example of such redefinition or codification can be
found in U.C.C. § 2-326 (1972). There the UCC defines the rights that attach to a con-
signment. An examination of that section will disclose that those rights are likely to be
quite different from ones that might be asserted in the consignment document itself.
Depending upon the form of the legislation, it is conceivable that one could chal-
lenge it for denying equal protection. Assume, for example, that the bankruptcy laws
were to recognize the debtor's pre-bankruptcy sale of any of its assets (putting aside the
question of voidable preferences and fraudulent advances) to anybody except sales to
those who somehow were defined as "financing agencies." Could not the financing agen-
cies argue that the abrogation of their rights, acquired in transactions for fair value and
in good faith, constituted a denial of equal protection if an identical sale to a non-financ-
ing agency would have been recognized and could not have been challenged in
bankruptcy?
A more significant inhibition on congressional action might be found here in its re-
spect of states' prerogatives. Of course, nearly all bankruptcy law somehow modifies
rights of private ownership under state law in a variety of ways. An outright redefinition,
however, of the private rights of ownership of one who had bought an asset from a bank-
rupt, or had made a bailment of an asset to a bankrupt, might even make a congressman
blush.
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for current consideration and in good faith, would merely accel-
erate the debtor's slide into bankruptcy, for the debtor would
find no one willing to deal with him in the face of the slightest
rumor of impending bankruptcy.
Conceivably, Congress could enact legislation that would do
the same thing to a lessor's interest as arguably has been done to
a consignor's interest by section 2-326. Congress, however, has
not yet done so; sections 1129 and 365 fall well short of such
action. Moreover, for Congress to do so would be a substantial
intrusion into an area traditionally reserved to the states con-
cerning the property rights of private parties.
In conclusion, it appears that factoring, leasing, and possi-
bly consignment, can be used by secured creditors to avoid some
of the more objectionable aspects of the cramdown, and possibly
even of the automatic stay. Accordingly, we can expect to see an
increase in their use and the rise of litigation concerning the le-
gal rights of factors, lessors, and consignors in bankruptcy.
D. Taking Greater Security
An obvious response to any reduction in a secured creditor's
rights is to take more security. One can expect, therefore, that
the first secured creditor in line will ask for a security interest in
a larger number of assets than he might have otherwise. If one
assumes that all of the assets of a typical bankrupt are subject
to some security interest at the time the petition is filed, the
consequence of a first secured creditor taking a larger share sim-
ply will be to shift the loss from one party to another. Such a
shift will not substantially change the position of the debtor, un-
less it means that other creditors will not lend at all when there
are no assets to secure them. If that is so, the potential pool of
creditors may become smaller than would otherwise be the case.
That consequence is problematical.
E. Guaranties
Another obvious response to adversity on the part of se-
cured creditors is to insist on guaranties. In the consumer con-
text these are likely to be from family members; in the context
of the small business they are likely to take the form of personal
[VOL. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Miss. L.J. 426 1983
SECURED CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
guaranties by the principals. With larger businesses they are
likely to be found in the guaranties of parent or subsidiary
corporations.
Except in Chapter 13 cases, where section 1301 stays collec-
tion efforts against sureties of consumer debts, the filing of a
petition by the principal does not stay collection efforts against
guarantors." Thus, in Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 proceedings,
one can expect secured creditors to turn to those who have guar-
anteed the debts.
F. Higher Rates
The fourth and most obvious response to reduction in a se-
cured creditor's rights is likely to be an attempt to increase
charges. At least in the business context, where usury laws do
not limit the rates of charge, this is an obvious and almost cer-
tain response to a decline in the value of security. Conceivably
such higher rates may be offset by lower rates on the part of
unsecured creditors who may now enjoy a share of the assets
that formerly would have gone to the secured creditors. That, of
course, will not be true in the consumer context where the
debtor himself may enjoy that element of value, as for example,
when he buys the Corvette out of the estate for $8,000 instead of
having to pay $15,000 to the secured creditor.
G. Shifting the Risk to the Taxpayer; Guaranteed Loans and
Other State Assistance
Most of the responses discussed above are short-term and
93 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, §§ 524(c), 1301, 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), 1301 (Supp.
V 1981). See generally H. MiLS & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIE TO THE BNKU-rcY
REFORM ACT 421-23 (1979). Testimony before the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States indicated that creditors frequently required co-signatures on con-
sumer loans by the debtor's friends or relatives who generally were unaware of the legal
significance of their acts. In the belief that this practice unjustifiably deprived consumer
debtors of the full benefit of their discharge and upon finding the problem particularly
serious in Chapter XIII cases, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code adopted a special
automatic stay applicable in Chapter 13 to creditor efforts to collect consumer debts
from individuals liable on a debt with the debtor. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1301.01[1] (rev. 15th ed. 1983); P. MURPHY, CREDrros' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 18.02
(1980); Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L.
Ru. 3, 49-61 (1978).
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individualistic. If creditors' rights are sufficiently impaired that
creditors choose not to make certain loans, and further, if those
loans are perceived by Congress to be of sufficient social value, 9
we may expect to see new forms of federal loan guarantees of the
kind that exist today. Currently there are over 160 federal loan
guaranty programs.9' These are designed to benefit the veteran,
home buyer, farmer, student, synthetic fuel manufacturer, car
manufacturer, and even small airlines. For the same reason that
private parties often improvidently grant guaranties, Congress
itself has been willing to guarantee many forms of loans. At the
outset a guaranty looks free - one simply puts his name behind
another - and if everything goes as expected and planned, he is
never called upon to pay a penny. Indeed, the guarantor may
charge a fee for the use of his name and thus make money by
giving his guaranty.
It is difficult to predict when and where Congress might be
moved to guarantee new types of loans. The frequent enactment
of such legislation, however, suggests that we have not seen the
last loan that Congress will guarantee. One can visualize a scena-
rio under which creditor responses would reduce the level of
credit for certain kinds of activities below that deemed accept-
able to Congress, and in which Congress would step in. Consider
the following scenario. Assume, for example, credit unions,
banks, and other traditional automobile lenders find that they
cannot lend money profitably against automobiles in part be-
cause of the large number of bankruptcies in which the owners
of automobiles retain the car, do not reaffirm, and discharge the
debt by a payment much lower than the outstanding debt. As-
sume that these lenders cease making car loans and turn instead
to treasury bills or business borrowers. Conceivably some who
might be willing to make car loans find that they-are unable to
do so profitably because the usury limit prohibits them from ac-
quiring a market rate." How might Congress respond to a pro-
" A more cynical analysis might lead one to ask whether those seeking loans have
sufficient political influence.
91 See Comment, The Choateness Doctrine and the Federal Loan Programs-A
Plea for Federal Legislation, 33 ME. L. REv. 269, 269 (1981).
" A number of empirical studies have found that when the market rate of interest
exceeds the usury limit, the result is a decrease in the amount of available credit. See
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posal for federal guarantees? A Congressman voting for such
loans could simultaneously court the automobile industry, the
UAW, and hundreds of thousands of prospective car buyers.
Moreover, a guaranty does not "cost" anything, and the whole
program can be portrayed as cost-free.
The automobile scenario may be farfetched. It is not far-
fetched, however, to suggest the enactment of government guar-
antees in arenas now unforeseen where creditors have withdrawn
and when Congress perceives a need.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, I apologize for the poverty of my imagina-
tion. Several of the suggestions about creditor behavior that I
have made could have been devised by a first-year law student.
Surely the creditor's lawyer will propose much more innovative
and elegant devices than I have suggested here.
I apologize too, for not addressing what is the single most
interesting question here; namely, whether society will be bene-
fited by the net accomodations that will arise from the change in
the law offset by the creditors' responses. It is conceivable that
the methods adopted by the creditors as substitutes, such as
leasing and factoring, will be less efficient means to accomplish
the same goals as the taking and perfecting of a security interest
in personal property.
If, as I suggest, Congress is moved to guarantee certain con-
sumer and business loans, it seems inevitable that we will have
produced an inefficient response. The recent history with the
student loans has shown how horribly costly such a system can
be.97 Although the abuses and difficulties have not been as obvi-
Note, Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy and Proposal for Reform, 33
VAND. L. REv. 199, 212-18 (1980).
9 At least initially, in that system there was no significant motivation on the part of
the universities to make collection. Default rates soared far above the rates that would
have been experienced or tolerated by any private lender. See generally Hunter, Collect-
ing Defaulted Student Loans: How Much Diligence is Due?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 149 (1982-83);
Skipping Out on Alma Mater: Some Problems Involving the Collection of Student
Loans, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317 (1980); Doyle, The Federal Student Loan
Mess, Wall St. J., May 19, 1982, at 28, col. 4. According to the latest available figures, the
default rate (number of loans in default as a percent of cumulative matured loans) for
1979 was 16 percent for National Direct Student Loans and 11.5 percent for Guaranteed
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ous in other areas, one suspects that a careful examination of
the Small Business Administration, or of a variety of the other
guaranty programs, might reveal similar, if less dramatic, ineffi-
ciencies. Of course, that is not to say that Congress was wrong in
establishing these programs. At least if there was no other more
efficient method of accomplishing the Congressional goal, per-
haps the cost was worth it.
If one considers the simplicity of acquiring and perfecting a
security interest under Article 9, and notes how widely the Arti-
cle 9 security interest has been accepted and applied,98 it seems
unlikely that creditors regard factoring and other such ancient
substitutes to be as efficient. If the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 and a series of other events occurring be-
tween 1965 and 1980 have substantially diminished the rights of
personal property secured creditors, history tells us that those
creditors will seek to regain their lost ground in a variety of
ways. The principal consequence of the erosion of creditors'
rights may be to drive creditors to the use of less efficient means
of acquiring the same results, or to transfer the burden of in-
creased cost to the taxpayers through guaranty programs. The
question for scholars, for courts and ultimately for legislatures is
whether society will have profited from the net changes when
matters once again come into equilibrium.
Student Loans. The default rate for Guaranteed Student Loans rose to 12.5 percent in
1980. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981 163
(102d ed. 1981). By comparison, the delinquency rate-number of loans delinquent 30
days or more as a percentage of total installment loans outstanding-on bank install-
ment loans in 1979 was 2.93 percent. Id. at 519.
98 See supra notes 20 and 21.
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